We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information on criminals, on opportunities of crime enhancing the ability t o apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.
Introduction
Economic theory of law enforcement has primarily been built on static models. Since Becker 1968 seminal paper, the economic theory of compliance and deterrence has been con ned to static analysis even though the importance of dynamics as been recognized long time ago. The fundamental problem of a static model is the exclusion of learning and recidivistic behavior, as individuals are allowed to break the law only once.
Once we attend at a dynamic model rather than a static model of compliance, we must consider the source of dynamics. In other words, a fundamental issue is to understand why decisions by both potential o enders and the government at a given period are history path dependent. Di erent sources of history path dependence have been considered in the literature.
One source of dynamics is that the pool of potential o enders at time t depends on the pool of o enders at time t ,1 because a some o enders are detected and punished at time t , 1 and can no longer commit an o ense at time t e.g. they are imprisoned, b the o ense will continue until detected, c o enders solve an optimal stopping problem by c hoosing a path of o ense rate over a temporal horizon, or d gains from illegal activities are path dependent e.g. criminal know-how. Compliance rules at time t , 1 a ect the pool of potential o enders at time t. The government should choose compliance rules at time t that optimally deter o enses at the current period and at future periods. A second source of dynamics comes from the fact that potential offender's perceptions are determined endogenously incorporating information available to them. This information is generated within the economy as time goes by. 2 Compliance rules should be condition on the learning dynamics. As an example, raising the probability of detection increases the numberof occasions in which o enders get caught giving them more information about law enforcement.
Essentially the literature has considered`supply side' dynamics, that is, the path dependence is directly related to potential o enders. In this paper, we address`demand side' dynamics, that is, the path dependence is related to the enforcement agency and not to the o enders. We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information on criminals, on opportunities of crime enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a l o w er marginal cost. We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary ne could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise. If the present v alue of reducing the cost of enforcement tomorrow because of learning more than compensates the present cost of enforcement at the steady-state, then the government should set a higher-than-otherwise probability and reduce the ne appropriately.
A Model of Law Enforcement
Consider an economy of risk-neutral individuals who choose whether to commit an act that bene ts the actor by b and harms the rest of society b y h . The policy maker does not know individual's gain b, but knows the distribution of parties by t ype described by a distribution Gb with support 0; B , with a positive density gb. We suppose that h B , that is, not every o ense is socially undesirable.
The government at time t chooses a sanction f t and a probability of detection and conviction pt. The expenditure on detection and conviction to achieve a probability pt is given by CEtpt, where C: is the marginal cost and Et is a measure of past enforcement experience. In particular, we assume: Et = From 2, we can observe that if the current probability of detection and apprehension pt is more than the weighted sum of past probabilities Et, we have _ Et 0. Conversely, reducing the probability of detection and apprehensions a ects negatively deterrence experience. We could think that with less detection and apprehension, the agency forgets about past experience.
Regarding the cost function we assume that C0 = C 0, C 0 Et 0, and C 00 Et 0. These assumptions pose that the agency must detect and convict o enders in order to learn and the cost declines with the habit of detecting but at a decreasing rate. If a less-than-maximal sanction is the optimal solution, then it must be the case that = 0 , the constraint is not binding. From 6, we have that p f = h. Therefore, when F h, the optimal ne cannot be less-thanmaximal. A less-than-maximal sanction is possible if and only if F h .
Using these results in 5, we conclude that it if p 1+r= , w e h a v e a less-tha-maximal ne. The result follows from combining both p 1+r= and F h . 2
The marginal social cost of imposing a monetary sanction is zero and the marginal social cost of setting a probability of detection and punishment at the steady-state is given by C:1 , r+ . As long as p 1 + r= , the marginal cost of setting a probability of detection and punishment at the steady-state is positive. In this case, the usual high-ne-low-probability argument applies: we should take the sanction to its maximum and complement its deterrent e ect with a lower-than-otherwise probability. From Polinsky and Shavell 1999, we also know that the expected ne is less than the magnitude of harm h. In other words, there will be o enses which socially yield a negative surplus and nevertheless will be committed because it is too costly to deter them.
Take the case such that = 1 + r= . The marginal social cost of setting a probability of detection and punishment at the steady-state is zero. Therefore, the government is indi erent between probability and ne. Furthermore, unlike P olinsky and Shavell 1999, the expected sanction is equal to the magnitude of harm h. At steady-state, we have e cient deterrence. Only o enses that yield a socially positive surplus are committed.
The last case to consider is 1 + r= . The marginal cost of setting a probability of detection and punishment at the steady-state is negative. Therefore, the policy maker will take the probability to one and complement with the ne such that f = h.
The marginal social cost of setting a probability of detection and apprehension at steady-state assumes a critical role on the result. This marginal cost has two terms. The rst term, C:, is the usual in the law enforcement literature and the driving force of the high-ne-low-probability result. The second term, , measures the present v alue of reducing the marginal social cost of the probability of detection and punishment tomorrow. If the present value of reducing the marginal social cost of the probability of detection and punishment tomorrow more than compensates the present marginal social cost of that probability a t the steady-state, then the government should set a probability equal to one. Proposition 2 The condition for a less-than-maximal ne at the steadystate is more likely to be satis ed if a the elasticity of learning with respect to detection and conviction is high, b the discount rate r is small, and c the rate of memory is high.
Proof
The result follows trivially from p 1 + r= .2 A less-than-maximal ne at the steady-state is a consequence of enforcement learning being very valuable for the government to the point of setting a higher-than-otherwise probability. Proposition 2 states the conditions under which setting a higher-than-otherwise probability i s v aluable for the government: a when the probability a ects decisively the learning process, b when the government cares for the future, and c when there is learning. In particular, when = 0 no memory of past experience or when = 0 independent history, we h a v e the standard result f h,p f g: = C p . Proposition 3 The optimal steady-state probability decreases with r and increases with .
The result follows from the observation that the marginal cost of the probability increases with r and decreases with .2 A higher-than-otherwise probability is set by the government as the discount rate decreases as the future becomes more important and the rate of memory increases as the gains from learning become more important at the moment of setting the current probability.
Conclusion
We h a v e shown that a less-than-maximal sanction at steady-state is possible as a response to a dynamic feature of enforcement policy. The marginal cost of enforcement depends on a measure of learning provided by past enforcement experience. Setting a higher probability of detection and apprehension at time t , 1 provides a further gain in reducing the marginal cost of enforcement at time t. We have shown that this e ect leads to a higherthan-otherwise probability at steady-state. Aiming at optimal deterrence, the government could have to reduce the sanction to a less-than-maximal ne.
In our model, the possibility of a less-than-maximal ne at steady-state is somewhat extreme since it only happens if the gains from learning more than compensate the current marginal cost. In a model like the one by Kaplow 1990 , where nonmonetary sanctions are considered, there is a positive social marginal cost from imposing a sanction. As a consequence, our result should bere-interpreted as suggesting a less-than-otherwise sanction at steady-state because of a dynamic feature of enforcement policy.
An interesting extension of the model is to consider that an imprisonment term could also bene t the government in providing information about criminal opportunities. Setting longer imprisonment terms at time t , 1 reduces the cost of enforcement at time t. Consequently, the optimal imprisonment term at steady-state could behigher-than-otherwise. Polinsky and Shavell 1984 have argued that the monetary sanction should be taken to its highest value, and an imprisonment term should beused to complement it when the maximal ne is not very large. Using the rationale we h a v e provided in this paper, we could have a higher-than-otherwise imprisonment term with a less-than-otherwise ne at steady-state if the future marginal gains from learning more than compensate the current marginal cost of imprisonment.
